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ABSTRACT
National interest, also as a critisism against the pradigm of New Public 
Management (NPM), is very much emphasised nowadays in public polici-
es, even in sector ones. This article is about a removal from the classical 
meaning of general (public) interest to that new approach represented 
by certain EU Member States and the reasons behind. Our analysis focu-
ses on contextual motives and impacts of these changes illustrated by 
the Hungarian case. The result shows that the market of public utility ser-
vices has already been influenced by direct political considerations. Our 
findings indicate that these understandings for legitimate influence on 
EU market rules can also be derived from the legal framework itself. Me-
asures examined in the paper run completely counter to the spirit of the 
original intention of the founders of the integration, and recent changes 
in EU law do not seem to raise unavoidable obstacles to such cases. Les-
sons of this case may be relevant for other EU Member States as well, at 
least for those from the Central-European region.
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1 Introduction
Centralization may be an answer on problems brought by crises like in the case 
of Greece (Tsekos T. N. and Triantafyllopoulou A., 2016) and Hungary, or on 
effects of political turn like in Poland (Białecki, I., Jakubowski, M., Wiśniewski, 
J., 2017) in 2010s. Our hypothesis is that both of the two directions origi-
nate in economic reasons. This thesis can partially be proved by applying an 
inductive method in this study. The recent Hungarian example in public utility 
service provision is about actual changes in the way as direct political actions’ 
may influence the market. Lessons of this case may be relevant for other EU 
Member States as well, at least for those from the Central-European region. 
The authors evaluate these changes through the policy of administrative price 
cutting scrutinizing motives and reasons of measurements. Contextual issues 
are also important, because reorganizing (‘reform-’) strategies are not really 
built on evaluation logic of New Public Management (NPM). A national-value 
orientation and a very strong direct interest motivation are heavily involved. 
In the system of central influences, the meaning of evaluation is necessarily 
different than in the environment of liberalized market. Here it is much less 
based on actions of independent regulators, benchmarking or comparison 
when it comes to well-run undertakings.
It makes much difference whether sector policies and measures of EU Mem-
ber States are non-liberal or still compatible with the internal market law of 
public services. However, borderlines are nowadays rather relative between 
these qualifications especially from the point of view of those Member States 
which are reluctant enough to follow the mainstream without criticism. Based 
on the examination of that particular case, our research question is that in 
what extent recent trends in national policies and regulations of public ser-
vice provision are compatible with the requirements of the European Union 
from a legal and public policy perspective. Examples like the Hungarian case 
highlight the challenges and threats of recent understandings of state mea-
sures in services of general interests (SGEIs) at different intergovernmental 
levels in the 2010s. The present paper seeks to explore the international and 
domestic background for such trends and also evaluates, by analysing the rel-
evant EU regulatory framework, the margin of discretion left to the Member 
States in this respect.
2 Methods
After the international credit crisis (2008) and a moderate sovereign debt cri-
sis (in the decade of the 2000s) the former management structure of public 
services (Horváth, 2000) was questioned in Hungary. Social conflicts led to 
radicalism in politics. The effect on municipal activities and functions became 
very restrictive. Also as a response, the regulatory position of the state was en-
hanced, and central government preferences were greatly widened. In some 
European countries the crises have led to corrections in the competition pol-
icy of public services. In Greece, as a comparable case, municipal overspend-
ing had to be given up, with a turn to NPM-proposed alternative solutions 
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of service delivery (Tsekos T. N. and Triantafyllopoulou A., 2016). This policy 
involves increasingly the roles of private actors either as investors or volun-
teers. In strong contrast, the Hungarian case is one showing a trend towards 
pure centralism. The Hungarian example shows that the market of public util-
ity services has already been influenced by direct political considerations. In 
the meantime, public civil solutions and control are also rapidly neglected in 
welfare services, as it is also clear from the example of the education reforms 
in Poland (Białecki, I., Jakubowski, M., Wiśniewski, J., 2017). The Hungarian 
case may lead to a model of extensive state intervention.
The direct theoretical background of the paper is threefold. Firstly, coun-
try-specific2 but contextual crises studies are based on explanatory research 
(Hajnal, 2014; Hajnal and Rosta, 2016) of the present turn in the development 
of the country. Secondly, different concepts of ‘re-public’ solutions have re-
cently been used as explanatory variables like the concept of re-municipalisa-
tion (Hall, 2012; Pigeon et al., 2012, Water Remunicipalisation Tracker) and 
the re-emergence of municipal corporations (Wollmann and Marcou, 2010).In 
addition, the policy of Hungarian centralization model has been scrutinized in 
context by Horváth (2016) on this basis. Thirdly, the paper also examines the 
above process from the perspective of Member States’ obligations under EU 
law as public services are subject to EU internal market rules and EU competi-
tion rules (Sauter, 2014).
There are a few methods being combined in this paper:
i) EU law, though it also uses terms evolved at national level (i. e. public uti-
lities or/and public services), has a distinct conceptual framework (in deta-
ils, see Szyszczak, 2017). The EU terminology is based on the categories of 
Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI), Services of General Interest 
(SGI), and Services of Social General Interest (SSGI) recently, together with 
emergence of the ‘European Social Model’ (European Commission 2006). 
The former (SGEI) is used in primary law texts, without being defined in 
the Treaty or in secondary legislation. However, in the case-law of the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ) and EU Commission practice the-
re is broad agreement that SGEI refers to services of an economic nature, 
with the Member States or the EU being subject to specific public service 
obligations (PSO) as compared to other economic activities by virtue of a 
general interest criterion.3 The term SGI, the closest EU law equivalent to 
the traditional notion of public services (Sauter 2014, 17), is also derived 
from the practice. It is broader than SGEI and covers both market and non-
-market services which the public authorities classify as being of general in-
terest and subject to specific public service obligations (Bauby and Similie, 
2016a).
ii) Although evaluation studies of public sector (Wollmann, 2003) and insti-
tutional reforms (Kuhlmann and Wollmann, 2011) at intergovernmental 
2 Cf. Gajduschek, G., Horváth M., T., Jugovits, K., 2017.
3 See in particular the definition given by the ECJ in its judgments in cases C-179/90 Merci 
convenzionali porto di Genova, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 and C-242/95 GT-Link, ECLI:EU:C:1997:376.
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levels are based on the reform rhetoric of NPM, in this case the question is 
to what extent this terminology may be used, because the orientation of 
changes is clearly beyond the motivations of public service performance.
iii) The relationship to the NPM paradigm is opposed heavily by the present 
Hungarian central government,4 which involves the denial of market-ori-
entation in most of the public services and open competition for foreign 
investors. National interest is very much emphasised nowadays in public 
policies, even in sectoral ones. In addition, reform as terminology has been 
neglected in the rhetoric of the government since 2010. Official commu-
nication is instead built upon national community-based heuristic state-
ments. It seems that at least voters have been convinced.
The domestic background and international context have been explored on 
the basis of participant observation and comparative analysis carried out as 
being involved in national company‘s5 urban service management projects 
and activities, and as a part of the research in other domestic and internation-
al projects.6 For Chapter 4.1 and 4.2, we also obtained data from a specific ECJ 
case-law database7 containing a thematic collection of all ECJ cases related to 
the EU Member States’ public service provision legislation and administrative 
practice, as well as from a case study database resulting on field research and 
empirical data collection.8
3 Results
3.1 Starting Conditions in Context
The corporate government in the infrastructural sector came to the attention of 
the national-conservative Viktor Orbán’s government9 very early after the elec-
tion win in 2010 and its subsequent re-election in 2014. It obtained a two-thirds 
majority in both the Parliament and in most of the city assemblies. According to 
their narrative the former type of economic power was based on earlier polit-
ical bargaining called privatization by liberals, who were leading supporters of 
the transformation process from the formal system transition (1990) to joining 
the European Union (2004). The nationalist government coalition, consisting 
of so-called national conservatives supplemented with Christian Democrats, 
differentiated from but supported by extremists, wanted to re-make originally 
long-terms contracts in order to change the players of the game.
4 For the Hungarian Government’s approach, see the Magyary Zoltán Public Administra-
tion Development Programme (Mp 12.0), especially pp. 6–7, <https://magyaryprogram.
kormany.hu/admin/download/a/15/50000/Magyary_kozig_fejlesztesi_program_2012_A4_
eng_%283%29.pdf>.
5 Budapest Urban Management Centre cPlc.
6 COST Action Local Public Sector Reforms (LocRef) WG I External (Post-)NPM Reforms (2013–
16); MTA-DE Public Service Research Group ‚Regulatory Tools for Local Public Services’ project 
(2012–2017).
7 Non published database of the MTA-DE Public Service Research Group.
8 Case-study database of the same research group: <https://jog.unideb.hu/hu/node/191>.
9 Viktor Orbán is the Prime Minister of Hungary between 1998–2002, 2010–2018 and 2018 by 
now. This paper especially focuses on the period of 2010s.
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The really specific context of the Hungarian case that Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán argued on this issue in his campaign and by his general political attitude 
to the public was that foreign private companies had abused their dominant 
position by overcharging for their services.10 That was why the conservatives 
wanted to buy back shares of these companies. This was one of the key moti-
vations for changing the political system (Hajnal, 2014) and market relations, 
including public services provision. The national-conservative ideology here 
paradoxically focuses on state-centred solutions for every conflicting social 
or economic issue. Market-orientation shifted to state-centred defence of so-
called national interests.
In the background there is an economic logic linked to user charges. To under-
stand the recent situation let us go back to the transformation process. From 
that time user charges became again an important element of public finan-
cial transfers (Horváth and Péteri, 2001). User charges are also forms of sys-
temic financing mainly in public utility services. The long history of transition 
countries demonstrates that these sources may also be considered transfers 
depending on the decision regarding which level of government may collect 
them. In communist countries most urban services, like water and sewerage, 
central heating, and solid waste collection were free or the price was a sym-
bolic payment involving social rental flats. Some services were subsidized cen-
trally, particularly electricity and gas.
In the period of transformation giving these revenues ‘back’ to governments 
became a decision on financial transfers. This sector transition process was 
composed of several steps. Firstly, starting from 90s prices were to be liberal-
ized in the public sector. This was important even if the state enterprises were 
the only providers at the beginning. Secondly, conditions for competition had 
to be established. An emerging market was built up with privatization for 
these services parallel with the multiplying number of service providers. This 
was an opportunity to decide about the application of user charges.
In principle user charges are good for some different purposes of local gov-
ernment. These include covering costs and maximizing revenues, and they 
can act as an incentive for economical use. According to the theory (Bird, Ebel 
and Wallich, 1995) the importance of user charges is that municipalities can 
behave as service providers. It means that the correct (roughly marginal cost) 
price is achieved for public consumers. In the new situation the government 
politically criticized foreign providers to monopolize the definition of user 
charges. Additionally, after the elections quite a lot of criminal cases were 
created against top managers in public utility companies accusing them of 
political corruption.
However, on the basis of this radical political concept, there are quite a few 
arguments, based on pure economic interests, which seem to explain their 
10 See especially Orbán’s speech in Tusnádfürdő (Baile Tusnad, Romania, 26.07.2014) about his 
political programme. <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s- 
speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-
university-and-student-camp>.
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motivation. First of all an easy explanation is shown by the national govern-
ment with the support of consumer price indexes. It is illustrated in Figure 1 
in the Annex. The interrupted line below (signified by the arrow also) is the 
level of total Consumer Price Index in Hungary between years of 2003–2012. 
The level of water pipe services, solid waste management and disposal, waste 
water treatment, central heating and warm water services are typically at a 
higher level continuously. The rise of prices is higher in these sectors than the 
actual inflation rate. As an exemption, an extreme increase in prices of cen-
tral heating was compensated by the former government regime. However, 
others remained on the upper level when the nationalist government started 
its term from 2010. According to the official argument, utility companies, es-
pecially their foreign private owners, pulled out profits from households, that 
is to say, from ‘the nation’.
Behind this argument there are critics of two different inherited basic scenar-
ios in the ownership structure of public utility companies which had arisen by 
the 2000s. One is the model of formerly privatized companies. It was accused 
of uncontrolled monopolization by new government powers. The other mod-
el, i.e. companies remaining in municipal hands, was also criticized heavily be-
cause it was seen as affiliation the former government parties either at local 
or national levels.
As far as the first scenario is concerned, it was true that implemented solu-
tions of privatization in the public utility sector were rather different. In or-
der to properly understand this issue, let us turn to Bauby’s and Similie’s gen-
eralized classification (Bauby and Similie, 2014, p. 108) .There are two basic 
specific contractual models on the extension of the private sector in public 
services. The traditional French legal practice is based on lease and conces-
sion contracts. The German model prefers corporative structures in which the 
operating assets are corporatized and where in the asset holding company 
the private providing company (the operator of the concession) is a minority 
shareholder at the same time. From the second half of 1990s the German 
model was followed in Hungary, with the difference being that not only oper-
ating but also core assets (pipelines, networking works) were corporatized in 
many situations. The importance of this kind of systemic failure was realized 
about fifteen years later when it became clear that multinational private com-
panies have a strong position mainly in the situation when municipalities as 
local clients wanted to shift their contracts.
‘Who is responsible for this situation?’ The question was raised in the systemic 
turn from 2010, because the solution was against the basic legal regulation 
of the local government act of 1990, which was passed at the beginning of 
system transition. Core assets should have been kept in municipal ownership 
because marketing was prohibited by the law. There are different answers on 
the responsibility question from the government side, which are as follows:
i) Responsibility’ of former governments. Privatization had been preferred by 
central governments for many terms before 2010. However, public utility 
assets had not yet been registered at all. Content of ownership was not 
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defined earlier, especially during the long period of state socialism, where 
this kind of specification was not in question at all. So, the registry court 
registered memorandums of new private sector providing companies, wi-
thout any questioning in many situations.
ii) City leaders’ and politicians’ ‘responsibility’, who had been in position at that 
time. The new government accused its predecessors of selling out assets 
consciously, following only their own interests.
iii) Foreign investors’ ‘responsibility’. According to the political rhetoric interna-
tional professional companies wanted to obtain a monopoly in order to get 
extra-profit and only foreign interests were represented by them. It has 
been being emphasized by the government since 2010 that some of the 
West-European governments and German federal member states (Länder) 
are also shareholders in quite a few utility companies providing services in 
Hungarian cities and regional areas.
These above mentioned motives have been inspired by the policy of re-struc-
turing in public service corporate sector during the era of the nationalist gov-
ernment since 2010.
3.2 Public Services in the EU Integration
As a general rule, EU internal market and competition rules apply to services 
of general economic interest as well, save where they fall under specific regu-
lations or exceptional clauses of the EU Treaties. In this section, we will briefly 
outline the legal fundamentals relevant to SGEIs including those provisions 
escaping them from the generally applicable market rules.
Before the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, the matter of 
public service provision was not at the heart of the European integration pro-
cess. In line with the principle of subsidiarity under Article 5 of the Treaty of 
European Union (hereinafter TEU), a consensus have been reached between 
the Member States that each country has the competence to organize and 
finance its basic public services (Bauby, 2014, p. 99). It was based on the gen-
eral idea to balance the EU interest in the free market with the national public 
interests, which means that public enterprises, state monopolies, special and 
exclusive rights as well as SGI are compatible with EU law to the extent that 
they involve proportionate restraints with regard to the internal market and 
competition rules (Sauter, 2014, pp. 20–21 and 41). This early economic com-
promise has been expressed in certain (and still existing) provisions dating 
back to the original Rome Treaty of 1957 (currently Articles 37, 93, 106 and 
345 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, hereinafter TFEU), 
as guarantees for safeguarding the interests linked to the provision of public 
services.
Article 106(1) TFEU generally states that public undertakings and those en-
trusted with special or exclusive rights are not exempted from EU competition 
rules. Article 106(2), however, lays down a derogatory regime for services of 
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general economic interest (Bauby and Similie, 2016b), providing that these un-
dertakings are subject to EU competition law provisions (that is Articles 101, 
102 and 107 TFEU) only in so far as the application of such provisions does not 
obstruct the performance of their particular public service obligation.
Most cases concerning the EU competition rules and public services have 
been examined in the context of dominance abuse and state aid rules (Sau-
ter, 2014, p. 75). Granting exclusive or special rights to an undertaking often 
generates the dominant position itself that is the precondition for unlawful 
conduct under Article 102 TFEU which, as Article 106(2) suggests, may never-
theless be saved by referring to the ‘particular tasks assigned to them’. The 
legality of public monopolies and other entities (often operating as state-
owned companies) enjoying exclusive or special rights is supported by the 
freedom of Member States to choose their system of property ownership, 
guaranteed by Article 345 TFEU (Sauter, 2014, p. 44).11
Most forms of state aid are in principle prohibited under Article 107(1), unless 
they are found to be compatible with the internal market because of their spe-
cific objectives under paragraphs (2) or (3) of the same provision. In the case of 
SGEI, however, public service obligation compensation (that is where the State 
pays aid to undertakings as a compensation for fulfilment of PSOs), under 
certain conditions (see judgment of the ECJ in case C-280/00 Altmark Trans, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:415), does not qualify as state aid. In addition, non-economic 
SGI a priori fall outside the scope of Article 107 TFEU, since state aid rules only 
extend to services that qualify as economic activities (Sauter, 2014, p. 76).
Europeanization of Public Services. Although the above provisions had been in-
corporated into the founding Treaties in the very beginning of the European 
integration process, their role and significance have changed over time. The 
“Europeanization of public services”12 started only in the mid-eighties with the 
entry into force of the Single European Act. The SEA, together with the Com-
mission’s white paper on reforming the common market, set the objective of 
the creation of a single market by 31 December 1992. As the national mar-
kets in transport and energy have become integrated with this conception, 
public service obligations have been obstacles to market creation (Opinion of 
AG Colomer in case C-265/08 Federutility, ECLI:EU:C:2009:640; Prosser 2005, 
121). Thus, the process engaged by the SEA led to a progressive liberalisation, 
sector by sector (Bauby and Similie, 2016b). The case-law of the Commission 
and the ECJ also reflected this market-friendly attitude; provisions permitting 
special treatment for such services were interpreted narrowly and restrictive-
ly (Prosser, 2005, p. 12).
This free market orientation has been ‘constitutionalised’ in the Treaty of 
Maastricht, which set, by enacting a new clause (Art. 3a), “the adoption of an 
economic policy which is based [...] on the internal market [...] and conducted 
in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free com-
11 The text of Articles 102, 106, 107 and 345 TFEU see Annex 1 below.
12 Term borrowed from Bauby and Similie (2016a, p. 27).
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petition” as a common goal for the EU and its Member States. The advocates 
of the public service model responded to the reform by campaigning for a 
Treaty amendment (and even for a distinct ‘Charter of Public Services’) to rec-
ognize more clearly the distinctive role of public services. (Prosser, 2005, p. 
154).
These critical movements led to the first Commission Communication on ser-
vices of general interest of 1996, which laid a particular emphasis on the so-
cial elements of public services as well as the limits of market forces (Prosser, 
2005, p. 156). Then, the Treaty of Amsterdam has been amended by a new 
Article 16 of the Treaty of European Community (TEC) which, among the fun-
damental principles of the EU, reinforces the constitutional importance of the 
role and protection of SGEI obligations. As safeguarding public services is pri-
marily the interests of the Member States, the provision can be seen as a con-
firmation of the Member States’ traditional prerogatives and discretionary 
power in the organization of such services (Rusche, 2013, p. 102; Schweitzer, 
2011, p. 55; Varju, 2013, p. 112).
Although the real legal relevance of that provision is questionable (Ross, 
2000, p. 34), SGEIs have been treated since then less as an obstacle to the 
completion of the internal market and more as an expression of citizenship 
rights and so of value in themselves (Prosser, 2005, pp. 172–174; Varju 2013, 
p. 112). This approach was also confirmed by the practice of the Commission 
and the ECJ, as well as by the adoption of The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(in 2001) including a separate provision (Article 36) on right to access to SGEI.
The above process has assumed particular importance in the liberalization 
of specific sectors, especially in the field of utilities (Prosser, 2005, p. 174). 
Although market opening and access remained a central policy objective, 
other priorities were being also promoted. This ‘paradigm shift’ (Hancher and 
Larouche, 2011) is an important factor in explaining why the degree of liberal-
ization varied from sector to sector. The liberalization was extensive (though 
not complete), for instance, in telecommunications, or electronic communi-
cations. The energy market, however, remained dominated by the presence 
of natural monopolies (dominant undertakings by the Member States), where 
the specific public service grounds (universal service obligation, security of 
supply, environmental concerns) gave the Member States more opportunities 
to derogate from market liberalization (Prosser, 2005, pp. 174 and 192–194; 
Hancher and Larouche, 2011).
Regulation of Public Services in the Social Europe. The “safeguarding” provision 
introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty (ex-Article 16 TEC, now Art. 14 TFEU) 
has been slightly (but importantly) modified by the Lisbon Treaty, with an ex-
press reference to the protection of national autonomy under Article 4 TEU. 
The new provision expressly pointed out the Member States’ competence 
to provide, to commission and to fund such services. A Protocol on Services 
of General Interest (No. 26) was also added to the Treaties (TEU and TFEU). 
Reading Article 14 and the Protocol together, there is an even higher empha-
sis on national and local interests and a more state-centred approach seems 
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to be applied to the protection of public service values. Moreover, the Charter 
of Fundamental rights including the right to access to SGEI became binding 
with equal effect to the Treaties by entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
in 2009.
The above provisions reflect a political signal from the authors of the Lisbon 
Treaty that there is a need for protection of SGEI and particular local interests 
attached to them against the efforts of liberalization (Rusche, 2013, p. 106; 
Krajewski, 2011, p. 186). In other words, the Lisbon Treaty consolidated the 
‘welfare autonomy’ of Member States (Marćou, 2016, p. 14).
The process of Europeanisation of SGEI and the ‘paradigm shift’ outlined 
above in the context of the Treaty provisions was also manifested in the case-
law of the European Court of Justice and in the European Commission’s soft 
law (and practice). The details of the relevant cases will be discussed below, 
however, we only summarize the main issues from SGEI jurisdiction.
Turning to secondary legislation and soft law, a similar process can be seen 
in the Commission’s activity. The first SGEI Communication of 1996 was fol-
lowed by several others13 in the first half of the last decade. These pieces of 
soft law reflect a shift in emphasis, giving support to the more radical reading 
of the current Article 14 TFEU. The link between SGI and European citizenship 
as an important contribution to the values of European life was highlighted 
in the Commission’s communications, rather than seeing the former as obsta-
cles to the completion of a competitive single market (Prosser, 2005, p. 163).
The Commission’s legislative activity from the mid-2000s was largely influ-
enced by the case-law of the ECJ. The leading decision is the Altmark judg-
ment of 2003 in which the Court held that the discharge of PSO is not covered 
by Article 107(1) TFEU where it merely compensates the provider of a public 
service mission for the costs that arise due to the performance of the PSO and 
determined four cumulative criteria which have to be met for not qualifying 
public service compensation as state aid.
By declaring these group of financial compensation out of the realm of state 
aid concept, the Court, in essence, largely reduced the monitoring and deci-
sion-making competence of the Commission over national measures granting 
compensation for public services (Bauby and Similie, 2016b), as the judgment 
allows for a self-assessment by Member States of that issue. This means in 
fact, that Member States were left relatively free under the criteria defined by 
the Altmark judgment. In particular, the fourth condition (the option of using 
a benchmark as an alternative for a tendering procedure in order to ensure 
efficiency) leaves wide room for Member States discretion. Such an outcome 
of the judgment clearly follows from the above mentioned paradigm shift in 
the constitutional framework whereby the EU leaves the Member States free 
to organise the SGEI markets themselves (Vedder, 2013, p. 66).
13  See European Commission communications COM(2001)598, COM(2004)374.
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4 Discussion: Back to the Nation States?
4.1 Nation-based Reorganization in the Corporate Sector
There are three basic fields of corporate reorganization in the Hungarian pub-
lic utility sector recently: (i) ownership, (ii) exclusive rights and burdens and 
(iii) user charges. Municipalities and the national government directly forced 
buying back shares of providing companies from foreign private investors. 
Acts passed by the Parliament supported this policy directly through re-de-
fining and narrowing groups of authorized providers service by service. In 
further steps, consumers’ fees were restricted for inhabitants by the central 
government via direct influence in the market of delivery services, neglecting 
any regular tools of regulatory authorities.
i)	 Re-distribution	 of	 influence	 on	 ownership	 in	 the	 public	 utility	 sector. At the 
very beginning policies of municipalities, mainly of cities, shifted. In the over-
whelming majority of cases, party affiliation was the same as that at the cen-
tral government level. The performance of utility companies was criticised 
heavily here. The main argument arose as follows:
– high level of consumer fees in comparison,
– little contribution to local municipal revenues,
– dirty businesses,
– liability problems in public contracts
As answers, if municipalities sold at least partly their shares earlier, then they 
wanted to buy back providing companies and the exclusive rights on the de-
livery of particular services from private owners and managing companies. In 
cases of companies remaining in the hands of local governments, changes of 
corporate management were forced, leading to the establishment of general 
asset holding companies.
In the countryside, amalgamation of service providers occurred under the um-
brella of municipally or centrally owned companies. Private investors were 
forced by the government with sector laws on different public services (espe-
cially in the field of water, gas and electricity supply or waste management) 
to sell their majority shares. For instance, as a result the number of providers 
decreased to 20% from 2007 to 2014 in solid waste management. This has 
meant the integration of delivery service, in addition to change in the identity 
of the owners.
ii) Exclusive rights and special taxes. All of the new integrated providers ob-
tained exclusive rights to provide particular services of general economic in-
terests. This action is allowed by the secondary law of the EU. However, in the 
second phase of re-structuring, from 2012, several measures were undertak-
en by the national government to centralise profits from the energy, water, 
waste and other (funeral, park maintenance, chimney sweeping services) pub-
lic utility sectors.
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This is done by levying special central taxes. Providers are now burdened with 
tax levied on public utility networks on the basis of their length. There is an 
exemption if the company is 100 percent publically owned. Discrimination 
has been raised in several legal procedures, however so far these have not 
been obstacles for the implementation of obligations. Additionally, even mu-
nicipality-owned providers are burdened with other taxes, like income tax on 
waste management (this burden is also placed upon energy companies), tax-
es on unbuilt sites, fees on waste disposal in landfills, etc. In these cases the 
aim of the central government must have been to centralize business profits, 
especially not to leave them to municipal owners.
iii) User charges. The third phase of the reorganization in the service providing 
environment started from the beginning of 2013. From that time the central 
government has in four waves decreased consumer fees of particular utility 
services for inhabitant users. The political impact of this measure was clearly 
targeted in the government’s strategy. In the first round, from January 2013 
to 2014, electricity, gas and district heating fees have been gradually reduced 
to 75,44 %, 74,80 and 77,34 % of the original price (established in 2012 De-
cember) of these services respectively. Then, from July 2013, liquid waste, 
solid waste, chimney sweeping and drinking water fees have been cut to 90% 
(in the case of solid waste 93,78%) as compared to the price level of January 
2012, April 2012, December 2012 and January 2013. After 2014, the level of 
these utility fees has remained constant thus not following the decrease of 
energy prices on the world market.
Centrally ordered cut on tariffs of utility services was about a nominal 10–25 
per cent. A direct regulation of user charges for utility services became a ma-
jor focus of the Orbán government and one of its key policy aims. This popular 
policy (‘decrease burdens of families’) was also placed in the centre of the 
political agenda in order to win the 2014 elections. It was a very successful 
strategy from the nationalist right wing point of view in the general, EU and 
subsequent local elections. The political (and not policy) motivation is em-
phasized by the government in the way that the calculations for the savings 
of households are prescribed to be put on the official receipt sent out on a 
monthly basis. Even a coloured (!) background of this notice is obliged to be 
included by the law in order to make sure customers pay enough attention to 
the effect of the government intervention.
Now let us see the effect of the cuts. Annex 2 shows the change of custom-
er price indexes in recent years. The reduction is lower in each item than is 
prescribed by the law. This must be explained by reference to the cut on in-
habitants only. Legal persons and undertakings have to pay full price. Never-
theless, their rate is higher now than the original inhabitants’ charge before 
the direct regulation. In contrast, the fact is that energy prices decreased on 
the world market. In addition, different supplementary services (change of 
water meter, controls etc.) are more expensive, especially for non-residents. 
Consequently, the level of service provision is not rising or effectively worse 
than it was before. Providers try to escape from barriers of regulation. For 
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instance, waste collection companies went back to the phase of a fixed fre-
quency-based monthly charge from the existing quantity-based regime.
A clear evaluation of these input changes is shown by the fact that a third of 
existing solid waste management companies (171 in 2016) are working with a 
loss as a result of the described management policy.
4.2 Direct Impacts
The whole process of (re-)transformation in the public utility sector can be 
summarized as follows. The central government is extremely active in making 
rules for the economic environment of public utility service provision in this 
country. Since 2010, several measures have been undertaken to centralise 
profits from the energy, water, waste and other (funeral, park maintenance, 
chimney sweeping services) public utility sectors. Providers are now bur-
dened with a central tax levied on public utility networks. The general cut in 
prices of user charges is supplementary and a new supervisory fee has been 
introduced for an administrative regulatory authority. Additionally, municipal 
utilities were exempted from some of the taxes, but this is no longer the case 
and the financial burden for municipal utilities is now heavier, especially for 
the central government. Although maintenance costs are covered by user 
charges, tariffs are however defined by Parliament and the government. As 
far as working capital investments are concerned, because the company is ful-
ly owned by municipalities or the state, paradoxically, national and European 
Union grants were more easily available because no further guarantee was 
needed for keeping the new utilities in public hands. The aim of the nation-
al government seems to shift public utilities to non-profit-making services. 
In this case, neither the role of municipalities nor the providers’ presumable 
counter-interest has been specified. This process must have an effect on the 
public service level in a medium term perspective. The model of the process is 
shown by Figure 1 on the next page.
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Figure 1. A logic framework for the recent Hungarian centralization process
ϭͿĂŵĂůŐĂŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƌĞĨŽƌĐĞĚ ďǇ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ůĂǁƐ
ϮͿƌĞͲŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ
ϯͿƐƉĞĐŝĂů ƚĂǆĞƐ ŽŶ ƵƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ
ϰͿĐĞŶƚƌĂů ƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ĨĞĞƐ
ϱͿĂŵĂůŐĂŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ
ϲͿĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ;͍ͿŽĨDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐΖĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ
Source: Author
The brief understanding of the ‘EU law reading’ of Figure 1 is as follows.
i) From 2010, as already mentioned, there is a tendency in Hungary for larger 
local governments to acquire the majority of shares in companies being 
in charge of public utility service provision. In the name of ‘transparency’, 
sector law issued by the central government also assisted that process 
of strengthening public ownership in entities operating under private 
law. (The EU has no voice here as, under Article 345 TFEU, EU law does 
not concern the rules in Member States governing the system of property 
ownership.) In addition, these companies were also entrusted with exclusi-
ve rights by Hungarian local governments to fulfil certain municipal public 
service obligations (see point ii. in Ch. 6 above). As was already explained, 
EU law allows a wide discretion for Member States in choosing their instru-
ments (granting exclusive rights among them14) for the operation of SGEIs. 
Case-law of the ECJ also confirm that exclusive rights which restrict or even 
exclude competition in the internal market are not incompatible with EU 
law if they are necessary to ensure the performance of PSO assigned to the 
company concerned.
ii) The concept of ‘in-house’ refers to the implementation of re-municipalisati-
on which involves providing services (which can be operated under market 
rules) directly by public means ‘in house’ instead of contracting with pri-
14 See especially Article 106 TFEU and relevant secondary legislation.
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vate economic operators. However, the provisions of the EU public procu-
rement directives did not apply to ‘in-house operation’. ECJ case-law also 
made clear that Member States were not precluded from adopting rules 
which enable public undertakings to provide public services without being 
subject to the public procurement regime laid down by these directives. 
The Altmark decision (and subsequent Commission communications) also 
assisted this ‘leniency-direction’ in EU public procurement law.
iii) Then, as explained in point ii. Ch. 6, special taxes were levied on public uti-
lity sector. Although EU state aid rules generally prohibit tax burden im-
posed on undertakings in a selective way (Article 107 TFEU), the ‘escape 
routes’ in the regime can save Member States from the application of these 
general prohibitions.15 Moreover, the tax on the utility network lines was 
originally imposed as a ‘crises tax’, which is a measure to reduce the nega-
tive effects of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008. As it is clear 
from its communications16 the Commission shows more understanding to-
wards such initiatives and more flexibility in assessing the compatibility of 
national measures with EU competition rules.
iv) This process was followed by cutting utility fees (point iii. Ch. 6) by the 
central government making use of the regulatory competence granted by 
EU secondary law to Member States. Though price cap is one of the most 
serious interventions into market trends, the protection of household con-
sumers (‘Hungarian families’) seemed to be a good argument against EU 
rules, especially under the authorisation given by the revised consumer 
protection clauses of the latest electricity and gas directives,17 and in light 
of the ECJ’s Federutility judgment (C-265/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:205).
v) The next step is nationalisation, i. e. the acts of the Hungarian Parliament 
not allowing to acquire the majority of ownership for private market par-
ticipants in companies entrusted by public service provision. Here, Article 
345 TFEU also supports Member States in escaping from their general obli-
gations EU internal market and competition rules. The result of this policy 
is to redistribute shares in large service providing companies through get-
ting the entire (or at least almost) 100% of the property in them in order to 
guarantee the full ownership rights for the government.
vi) Even if the EU law compatibility of the above measures may be called into 
question, the (de facto!) enforceability of the assumed infringement can-
not be taken for granted. The effective protection of foreign undertakings’ 
rights, who, as a result of the above process, were excluded from the mar-
ket, cannot be ensured by the so-called infringement procedure (Art. 258 
TFEU) and preliminary rulings (Art. 267 TFEU) as both of them take very 
often years to reach the final decision in the case. This long period of time 
is perfectly enough to reach the targeted market result of the national le-
15 See e.g. state subsidies saved by the application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.
16 As an example, see the ‘2008 Banking Communication’ (OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p. 8).
17 See Article 3(7) of Directive 2009/73/EC and Article 3(3) of Directive 2009/72/EC.
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gislator (the case of the Hungarian gambling market or reorganisation of 
the voucher system clearly justifies this statement).18
4.3 Indirect Impacts
There are also indirect effects of the official Hungarian public utility policy. 
Firstly, infringement procedures by the European Commission are taking place, 
because consumers’ prices are defined by the ministry instead of the regulato-
ry authority. In addition, specific taxes, like a tax on the length of pipe networks 
and energy transaction fees must not be calculated as an accepted cost.
Secondly, competition is also under attack. There are different prices for 
inhabitants and undertakings, which appears to be discrimination. Newly 
established huge state owned enterprises are in better position in tenders, 
avoiding formal public procurement processes. Several antitrust procedures 
are initiated because of this reason. Although keeping state aid rules are also 
questioned, there are less of these kind of disputes in European institutions.
Thirdly, international investment disputes are taking place, because semi-na-
tionalization procedures under the new state owned property act and the 
actions of municipalities and the national state are questioned by private, es-
pecially foreign investors.
Fourthly, an indirect effect has been highlighted. Charges in the global mar-
ket of the energy sector decreased, until the Hungarian government froze 
prices at a static level.
Fifthly, the PR and propaganda of the government focuses on the cutting 
of charges in the utility sector. It is one of the key issues of the campaign 
called ‘The Hungarian reforms are working!’ The most important figures with 
regards to the savings are obliged to be put on receipts sent to owners of 
dwellings monthly. This policy has been an important strategy of the national 
government since the beginning of 2013.
Sixthly, some sector providers have become bankrupt, in such areas as chim-
ney sweeping, as well as many waste companies. In these cases, the national 
authority of civil defence becomes responsible for fulfilling public tasks, com-
pletely neglecting market actors.
5 Conclusion
All in all, according to independent lawyers, the legality deficit is quite serious 
in general in this situation either in the economic or political field. The tactics 
of the government have been realized mostly with ‘success’, because legal 
procedures are long-term, i.e. 4-6 years are needed, while advantages are re-
alized in financial and interest-based power games. The price of it is to be paid 
by the public as a whole.
18 See the ECJ judgments in cases C-98/14, Berlington, EU:C:2015:386 and C-179/14, Commission 
v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2016:108, as well as Varju and Papp (2016) for more details.
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As has already been proved, it is difficult in this case to term the actions of 
the government ‘reforms’, because the focus of the measures is more the 
reassessment of former preferences rather than improvement as such. As 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said in his speech at the national celebration on 
15 March 2016, ‘our results cannot be measured only with utilization, but the 
totality should be our preference’.
That is why ‘renewal’ is a more preferred term of the official PR, supplement-
ed together with reforms, instead of particular sector policies. However, the 
phrase ‘renewal’ is substituted with the more neutral term of reassessment in 
the figure prepared by our investigation. The anticipated far-reaching objec-
tives are very much interest-based, including economic interests of natural (na-
tional) monopolies. Comparing anticipated and non-anticipated aims we can 
conclude that the advantages of the intended effects are distributed to partic-
ular social and economic groups, while disadvantages are placed upon others.
In the above analysis, we identified a six-element process (amalgamation and 
transformation are forced by sector laws – re-municipalization – special taxes 
on utilities and utility services – central reduction of consumer fees – amalga-
mation and nationalization – problems in effective enforcement of Member 
States‘ compliance) which is able to change completely the market conditions 
for providing public utility services in an EU Member State. These actions in-
vestigated do not seem to be simply a package of intervention in order to 
achieve political aims, because – as we have proved – the development of EU 
law allows recently different (mis)understandings for the influence of the EU 
market rules from the side of the state (instead of the ‘public’ as such). It is 
also indicated by the analysis that EU rules are able to focus only on individ-
ual elements, but cannot serve as effective instruments against the whole 
(six-element) process of the change in the national ‘public service regime’. 
According to our research, at least we are sure to state that as a result of 
the implementation of utility policies recently in Hungary, service levels did 
not improve. So, the reform rhetoric is not working in these circumstances, 
because the orientation of changes is clearly out of the question of public 
service performance. However, measures examined above run completely 
counter to the spirit of the original intention of the founders of the integra-
tion, and recent changes in EU law do not seem to raise unavoidable obstacles 
to such cases.
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Annex 1. Fundamental provisions of EU primary law on SGEIs
FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS OF EU PRIMARY LAW ON SGEIS 
 
Article 14 TFEU 
Without prejudice to Article 4 of [TEU] or to Articles 93, 106 and 107 [TFEU], and given the place occupied 
by services of general economic interest in the shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting 
social and territorial cohesion, the Union and the Member States, each within their respective powers and 
within the scope of application of the Treaties, shall take care that such services operate on the basis of 
principles and conditions, particularly economic and financial conditions, which enable them to fulfil their 
missions. The European Parliament and the Council [...] shall establish these principles and set these 
conditions without prejudice to the competence of Member States [...] to provide, to commission and to fund 
such services. 
 
Article 102 TFEU 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial 
part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between 
Member States. 
 
Article 106 TFEU 
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive 
rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules [on 
competition] contained in the Treaties. 
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the 
character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in the Treaties, in 
particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the 
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not 
be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Union. 
 
Article 107 TFEU 
[...] any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts 
or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market. 
 
Article 345 TFEU 
The Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property 
ownership. 
 
Protocol (No 26) on Services of General Interest annexed to TFEU 
Article 1 
The shared values of the Union in respect of services of general economic interest within the meaning of 
Article 14 [TFEU] include in particular: 
- the essential role and the wide discretion of national, regional and local authorities in providing, 
commissioning and organising services of general economic interest as closely as possible to the needs of 
the users; [...]  
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 36 
Access to services of general economic interest 
The Union recognises and respects access to services of general economic interest as provided for in national 
laws and practices, in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community, in order to 
promote the social and territorial cohesion of the Union. 
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Annex 2. Trends of Consumer Price Indexes according to 
consuming in particular public services (2003–2012)
Source: STADAT COICOP indexes, 2013
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Annex 3. Municipal corporations and field of re-municipalisation 
(Budapest Urban Management Centre cPlc)
Source: Budapest City Council
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